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Garden Leave, The Right to Work and
Restraints on Trade
Amanda Coulthard*
BearingPoint Australia Pty Ltd v Hillard [2008] VSC 115; BC200802664
Tullett Prebon (Australia) Pty Ltd v Purcell (2008) 175 IR 414; [2008]
NSWSC 852; BC200807684.
Employers concerned to protect confidential information and customer
connections after the termination of the employment relationship are often
advised to include post employment restraints in the contract of employment.
Such restraints may seek to cover working for a competitor, solicitation of
customers and the poaching of continuing employees. Lawyers approach the
drafting of post employment restraints with caution. Although courts do
enforce them, there is always the concern that a court will find a restraint —
even one that has been most carefully considered and drafted — goes beyond
what is reasonable to protect the legitimate interests of the employer in
protecting customer connections, confidential information and the
maintenance of a stable workforce. Perhaps in response to the difficulty
surrounding the drafting and enforcement of post employment restraints
employers seem to increasingly be relying upon the practice of directing an
employee to take ‘garden leave’ while the period of notice runs its course.
How effective this practice might be has been the subject of litigation in the
United Kingdom,1 the United States2 and to a lesser extent here in Australia.3
Two recent Australian cases must now cast doubts upon the effectiveness of
the practice of sending an employee on garden leave instead of relying on a
post employment restraint. In BearingPoint Australia Pty Ltd v Hillard4 the
Victorian Supreme Court refused to grant an injunction preventing an
employee from working while on a period of 180 days garden leave on the
basis that to grant the injunction would be in effect to order specific
performance of the contract of employment. More recently, in Tullet Prebon
* Faculty of Law, Bond University and Special Counsel with Franklin Athanasellis Solicitors,
Brisbane.
1 See, eg, Provident Financial Group PLC & Whitegates Estate Agency v Hayward [1989] 3
All ER 298; [1989] ICR 160; [1989] IRLR 84; William Hill Organisation Ltd v Tucker
[1999] ICR 291; [1998] IRLR 313; [1998] EWCA Civ 615; In the Matter of Symbian Ltd v
Christensen [2000] EWHC 458 (Ch) and on appeal [2000] EWCA Civ 517; SG & R
Valuation Service Co v Boudrais [2008] EWHC 1340 (QB); and TFS Derivatives v Morgan
[2004] EWHC 3181.
2 See, eg, the recent decision of the US District Court for the District of Massachusetts in
Bear, Stearns & Co, Inc v Sharon 550 F Supp 2d 174. For discussion of the potential
approach in the United States, see G T Lembrich, ‘Garden Leave: A possible solution to the
uncertain enforceability of restrictive employment covenants’ (2002) 102 Columbia L Rev
2291.
3 Wesoky v Village Cinemas International Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 32; BC200100100. For some
comment on the practice of garden leave, see also G McCarry, ‘Termination of Employment,
Payment in Lieu of Notice, Garden Leave and the Right to Work’ (1999)12 AJLL 1.
4 [2008] VSC 115; BC200802664 (BearingPoint).
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(Australia) Pty Ltd v Purcell,5 the NSW Supreme Court, applying the doctrine
of restraint of trade, refused to grant an injunction preventing the employee
from working for a competitor during a period of garden leave that ran until
the expiry of the contract’s fixed term, a period of more than one year.
Before turning to examine the approach taken in these two cases it is useful
to say a little more about what is meant by garden leave and why employers
might seek to rely upon the practice. The contractual basis relied upon by each
of the employers in BearingPoint and TP Australia to direct the employee to
take garden leave will then be examined. We will see that in BearingPoint the
employer relied upon an implied contractual right to send the employee on
garden leave, whereas in TP Australia the contract of employment contained
a comprehensive express garden leave clause. The note will then concentrate
on the different approaches taken in BearingPoint and TP Australia to the
enforcement of the practice of garden leave. The note then concludes that
courts will not allow an employer to use garden leave to restrain employees
to any greater extent than would be possible under a reasonable post
employment restraint clause.
What is Garden Leave and Why Use It?
Garden or gardening leave is a euphemism for a practice that involves the
employer directing an employee not to attend work during the period of notice
of resignation or termination of the employment.6 The employee might be
given no work or limited duties, and/or be required to be available during the
notice period to, for example, assist with the completion of work or ensure the
smooth transition of work to their successor. Otherwise, the employee is given
no work and is directed to have no contact with clients or continuing
employees. During the period of garden leave, the employee is paid their
salary and any other contractual benefits that he or she would be paid were
they continuing to render their services to the employer. It is argued that
because the employer is still remunerating the employee the practice of garden
leave is contractually permissible or, to put it another way, does not amount
to a repudiation of the contract by the employer.
Based on the premise that the contract remains on foot during the notice
period, it is assumed that the employee therefore remains bound by their
continuing implied duty of good faith and fidelity and by any express clauses
in the contract of employment with respect to, for example, exclusive service.
These obligations would be sufficient to prevent the employee from soliciting
current customers and employees, or working for a competitor while the
notice period runs.7 The business is further protected because the employee is
physically prevented from having continued access to confidential information
5 (2008) 175 IR 414; [2008] NSWSC 852; BC200807684 (TP Australia).
6 This note concentrates on garden leave in the context of termination of employment. It can,
however, arise in other situations. For example, Madgwick J considered the right to send an
employee on garden leave in the context of determining whether an employer ordered to
reinstate an employee was required to provide the employee with work: Blackadder v
Ramsey Butchering Pty Ltd (2002) 118 FCR 395; [2002] FCA 603; BC200202318 at [61].
7 These duties do not generally survive beyond the termination of the employment. Thereafter
an employer will need to rely upon any express contractual terms prohibiting competition
and the application to those terms of the doctrine of restraint of trade, intellectual property
88 (2009) 22 Australian Journal of Labour Law
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and intellectual property. So, garden leave is seen as having the same function
or achieving the same result as a post employment restraint. The obvious
disadvantage to the employer is that it must continue to pay the salary and
other benefits without receiving the usual consideration in return.
It is further assumed that because the contract is still on foot a court will
enjoin an employee for the period of the garden leave from acting in breach
of any of those continuing employment obligations such as joining a
competitor or soliciting the business of existing customers. It is this issue of
enforceability of the continuing duty of good faith and fidelity during garden
leave that was particularly tested in BearingPoint and TP Australia.
An Implied Right to Direct an Employee to Take
Garden Leave and the Duty to Provide Work
In the absence of an express term, the courts do not approach the issue of
garden leave by asking whether there is to be implied into the contract of
employment a right to send an employee on garden leave and, if yes, the limits
on the exercise of that right.8 Instead, whether an employer is entitled to direct
an employee to take garden leave during the contractual period of notice has
been answered by determining whether the employee has the right to work, or
rather, whether the employer has a duty to provide the employee with work.
If there is no right to work or no duty to provide work, the courts have been
ready to hold that the employer can direct the employee to take garden leave
on the basis that to do so does not involve a repudiation of the contract of
employment by the employer not providing work.
Whether there is an implied duty to provide work continues to be the
subject of academic and judicial debate. It is beyond the scope of this note to
revisit that debate but something must be said of the courts’ approach to the
issue in the context of garden leave cases. In Australia, despite a comment
made by Callinan and Heydon JJ in their joint judgment in Blackadder v
Ramsay Butchering Services Pty Ltd,9 the current position remains that there
is no generally implied duty for an employer to provide work so long as the
contract stays on foot and the employee continues to be remunerated.10 An
express term in the contract requiring the employer to provide work aside,
whether there is a duty to provide work depends upon an analysis of the terms
of the particular contract and its surrounding circumstances. This is the
approach that has been consistently taken in the English authorities to date.11
rights and the continuing duty of confidentiality. For discussion, see R Owens and J Riley,
The Law of Work, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp 233–47.
8 This point was made by Mr Justice Cranston in the England and Wales High Court in SG &
R Valuation Service Co v Boudrais [2008] EWHC 1340 at [18].
9 (2005) 221 CLR 539; 215 ALR 87; [2005] HCA 22; BC200502369 at [80]. For comment on
this case, see J Riley, ‘Pensioning off Lord Asquith’s Cook’ (2005) 18 AJLL 177.
10 Ramsey Butchering Services Pty Ltd v Blackadder (2003) 127 FCR 381; 196 ALR 660;
[2003] FCAFC 20; BC200300382 and cited with approval in BearingPoint [2008] VSC 115;
BC200802664 at [88].
11 See, eg, William Hill Organisation Ltd v Tucker [1999] ICR 291; [1998] IRLR 313; [1998]
EWCA Civ 615; SG & R Valuation Service Co v Boudrais [2008] EWHC 1340.
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It has been relied upon and followed in Australia.12
Although each case depends upon the particular contract, the courts have
developed categories of employment relationships in which a duty to provide
work will, or will more readily, be implied. For example, the courts have
found a duty to provide work in theatrical engagements, where the
employment is for a specific project, where the position is specific or unique,
where the skills in question require frequent exercise in order that they be
enhanced and preserved, and where the promised remuneration depends on
the employer providing an opportunity to earn it.13
It has been argued that recent cases demonstrate that the circumstances in
which a court will find a right to work have been expanding.14 Be that as it
may, a case-by-case approach, while flexible, carries with it uncertainty. The
outcome depends upon the court’s interpretation of the terms of the particular
contract in the context of the surrounding circumstances. Interpretations or
impressions as to whether the employment falls into one of the above
categories might reasonably differ. So, for example, in BearingPoint the court
found that there was no duty for the employee to be provided with work, in
circumstances arguably not so very different from those in William Hill
Organisation Ltd v Tucker where the court found that there was a duty to
provide work.15
BearingPoint is a management technology consulting company.16 Robert
Trevor Hillard (Hillard) was employed as its managing director of information
management. His contract was terminable on the giving of 180 days notice.
There was no express garden leave clause in the contract. Hillard had become
dissatisfied with his work. He had started to look around. This was known to
BearingPoint. Ultimately, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsue (Deloitte) offered him a
non-equity partnership. Hillard signed a letter of intent with Deloitte but
maintained that this did not constitute an acceptance of Deloitte’s offer and
that he had not resigned from BearingPoint. He wanted to keep his options
open. BearingPoint of course took a different view. It wrote to Hillard
asserting that by his conduct he had resigned. It said it would try to get him
to change his mind but, in the meantime, he would be removed from ‘active
client facing work’ and that (presumably subject to any change of mind) his
employment would end in 180 days. He was instructed that during that period
he was not to attend the office or contact any of BearingPoint’s clients,
prospective clients or employees without consent. His laptop computer,
without which he could not perform his role, was taken from him. Not long
after, another employee was engaged to carry out his duties and functions.
BearingPoint continued to pay Hillard his remuneration although there was a
dispute over some stock entitlements.
Hillard responded in writing to BearingPoint stating that by removing him
from contact with clients, employees or from his duties generally
12 Wesoky v Village Cinemas International Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 32; BC200100100;
BearingPoint [2008] VSC 115; BC200802664.
13 These examples were given by Morritt LJ in William Hill Organisation Ltd v Tucker [1999]
ICR 291; [1998] IRLR 313; [1998] EWCA Civ 615 at [16].
14 Wesoky v Village Cinemas International Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 32; BC200100100 at [17].
15 [1999] ICR 291; [1998] IRLR 313; [1998] EWCA Civ 615.
16 The facts of the case are set out: [2008] VSC 115; BC200802664 at [2]–[78].
90 (2009) 22 Australian Journal of Labour Law
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BearingPoint had placed him on garden leave. As there was no express garden
leave clause in his contract of employment Hillard asserted that placing him
on garden leave was a repudiation of the contract. He said that he was
accepting this repudiation as bringing the contract to an end. Hillard thus
regarded himself as free to take up employment with Deloitte’s, asserting that
express post employment restraints in the contract were unreasonable.
BearingPoint responded by seeking undertakings from Hillard that he would
not contact their clients or solicit current employees, or take up employment
with Deloittes until the end of the notice period. Hillard refused to give those
undertakings and told BearingPoint that he would be taking up employment
with Deloittes. BearingPoint sought an interlocutory injunction. Before the
matter came on for hearing Hillard hedged his bets and gave 180 days notice
of termination in the event that his reliance upon what he said was
BearingPoint’s repudiatory conduct had not in fact brought the contract to an
end.
When the matter came on for final hearing the first point that the court had
to deal with was whether in directing Hillard to take garden leave for the
duration of the 180 day notice period, thus depriving him of work and
sterilising his ability to work, it had repudiated the contract of employment.
Following the approach outlined in the earlier cases above the court asked
whether, in the circumstances of this contract, BearingPoint was obligated to
provide Hillard with work or merely pay him the amount it was required to
pay him under the contract.
Hillard argued that he was contractually engaged to perform the specific
functions and responsibilities of information manager and that there were no
terms in the contract that supported his removal from that position. Further, he
pointed to the fact that part of his remuneration was contingent on his
continuing to perform work. The nature of his work was skilled. In a fast
moving industry he would have difficulty maintaining those skills and would
risk falling behind if he did not work. He argued that his employment involved
not only remuneration, but the opportunity to keep his name and talents
prominent in the market. His arguments were persuasive and on reading them
one might be forgiven for thinking that there was enough there (as was the
case in William Hill Organisation Ltd) for the court to find that his
employment fell into one of those categories in which a duty to provide work
might be implied. But the court held that Hillard did not have a right to work.
Instead, the court held that his contract should be construed to contain an
implied term that BearingPoint was entitled to direct Hillard to go on garden
leave for the duration of the 180 day notice period. The court accepted a
construction of the contract that entitled BearingPoint to vary or modify
Hillard’s duties to the extent of being able to remove him from all contact with
clients and staff in the circumstances then prevailing, that is, his intention to
resign and work for a competitor. While bonuses were tied to performance
they were entirely at the discretion of BearingPoint. This put paid to an
argument that his remuneration was tied to work. While Hillard’s position was
important, it did not fall into the category of ‘unique or special’ and nor did
his skills and expertise require frequent exercise during the notice period in
order that they be enhanced and preserved. The court said that Hillard could
maintain his skills through reading, attending workshops, communicating with
Garden Leave, The Right to Work and Restraints on Trade 91
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experts in the field and the like.17 So a direction to Hillard that he spend the
contractual notice period of 180 days on garden leave did not repudiate the
contract. The contract remained on foot.18
Once the court had determined that the contract remained on foot, the
question was whether the court was prepared to grant an injunction, enforcing
the garden leave by preventing Hillard from engaging in any other
employment, in particular with Deloittes, and from contacting clients,
prospective clients or continuing employees during the 180 day notice period.
The court refused to grant the injunctions sought on the basis that to do so
would in effect amount to an order of specific performance of the employment
contract. An analysis of the court’s approach to the enforcement of garden
leave will be taken up later in this note. But first, consideration is given to
whether including an express garden leave clause in an employment contract
is advisable in pre-empting the uncertainty surrounding an implied right to
direct an employee to take garden leave.
An Express Garden Leave Clause — The Solution?
Perhaps because of the uncertainty surrounding the implications of an
entitlement to send an employee on garden leave, or to put it more accurately,
whether in any particular case there is a duty to provide work, there is
anecdotal evidence that employers are now being advised to include an
express garden leave clause in the contract of employment. It might also be
argued that the failure to put an express garden leave clause in a contract,
when the parties have the ability to bargain for one, should weigh against the
finding of an implied right.19 Indeed, Madgwick J in Blackadder v Ramsey
Butchering Pty Ltd, in the context of a discussion on the duty to provide work,
said that an employer had the option of including a garden leave clause in the
contract of employment.20 It is also interesting to note that there have been
some applications for garden leave clauses to be inserted into awards.21
An express garden leave clause might be drafted to cover a number of
issues: that the employer in the event of notice of resignation or termination
has the right to direct an employee not to attend work, not to perform their
usual work or have contact with clients and employees; that in those
circumstances it is agreed that the employer has no obligation to provide
work; how the employee will continue to be remunerated; and that otherwise
the parties’ obligations under the contract will continue. This was the approach
taken by TP Australia in its contract of employment with Simon Purcell.
TP Australia carried on business as a brokerage in the wholesale financial
market, facilitating trading activities between major dealers such as
17 [1999] ICR 291; [1998] IRLR 313; [1998] EWCA Civ 615 at [92]–[107].
18 Ibid, at [130].
19 This argument was put and, although not accepted, was said to be one that had ‘its
attractions’: SG & R Valuation Service Co v Boudrais [2008] EWHC 1340 at [14].
20 (2002) 118 FCR 395; [2002] FCA 603; BC200202318 at [61].
21 See, eg, Clerical and Administrative Staff (International Freight Forwarding and Customs
Clearing Industry) Award 1992 re Award simplification [2003] AIRC 804; PR934444; 9 July
2003. The employer’s application was refused on the basis that a garden leave clause could
lead to ‘confusion and potential disputation’: at [24].
92 (2009) 22 Australian Journal of Labour Law
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commercial and investment banks.22 Purcell was a broker. He had been
employed since 1999 by TP Australia in the interest rates swaps and
derivatives market. Most recently, in July 2007, he had entered into a fixed
term contract with TP Australia. Although for a fixed term of two years, the
contract could be terminated by either party on the giving of three months
notice to the other, provided that, such notice could not expire before the end
of the two year term.
The contract went on to acknowledge that should TP Australia wish to
terminate the employment or should Purcell wish to leave it might not be
appropriate for him to continue performing his duties having regard to his
position and his access to confidential information. In those circumstances, it
was expressly agreed that TP Australia would not be required to provide
Purcell with any work and that he might not be required to attend work.
TP Australia agreed that it would meet Purcell’s contractual entitlements
during any period that he was not required to work, except for any bonus or
profit share determined by reference to personal performance. The clause then
went on to provide that for so long as Purcell would not be required to work
he would remain employed and be bound by all of the terms of the contract.
Further, during the period of garden leave he could not work for any person,
have any contact with a defined category of clients with whom he had had
dealings during a defined period, nor have contact with a defined category of
employees of TP Australia, without TP Australia’s prior written consent.
TP Australia also expressly reserved to itself the right to require Purcell to
mitigate his loss by obtaining alternative employment that it considered
acceptable.
The clause was comprehensive. It addressed expressly the question of
whether the employer had an obligation to provide work that had been the
central issue in the earlier cases on garden leave. The clause went further in
dealing with the parties’ rights and obligations during any period of garden
leave. The parties expressly acknowledged the continuation of the
employment and that Purcell remained bound by the terms of the contract.
Those terms included that Purcell perform his duties ‘faithfully and
diligently’, devote all of his working time and attention to TP Australia, and
that he not accept employment or render services to a competitor of
TP Australia. The garden leave clause spelt out what contact Purcell could
have with clients and continuing employees. It also provided that during the
period of garden leave Purcell could not work for any person without the
consent of TP Australia.
In repudiation of his contract, Purcell resigned his employment with
TP Australia, with immediate effect, when the two year term had still more
than a year to run. He had found another job. TPAustralia elected not to accept
Purcell’s repudiatory conduct and affirmed the contract. It also elected to
exercise its rights under the garden leave clause. Purcell was told that he was
not required to attend work and he was reminded of his contractual
obligations. He would continue to be paid his base remuneration in
accordance with the garden leave clause.
22 The facts of the case are set out: (2008) 175 IR 414; [2008] NSWSC 852; BC200807684
at [2]–[21].
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Purcell started the job he had accepted with one of TP Australia’s
competitors. TPAustralia sought injunctions restraining him from doing so or
otherwise contacting clients or continuing employees in breach of the garden
leave clause until the expiration of the term of the contract in July 2009.
The garden leave clause in Purcell’s contract certainly pre-empted any
argument as to the contractual right to send Purcell on garden leave. The court
did not need to consider whether in not providing him with work TPAustralia
had repudiated the contract.23 Therefore the contract — as was the case in
BearingPoint — remained on foot.24
The question then was whether the court would, in effect, enforce the clause
by granting the injunctions sought. We will see that despite the use of an
express garden leave clause — and a particularly comprehensive one at that
— TP Australia was ultimately in no better position than BearingPoint when
it came to enforcing garden leave. The effectiveness of the garden leave clause
fell down at the point of enforcement. It is thus to a discussion of the
enforcement of garden leave clauses — and hence their effectiveness — that
this note now turns.
The Problem of Enforcing a Contract for
Personal Services
The general rule is that equity will not intervene to specifically enforce a
contract to render or receive personal services. An exception has been made
in cases where the contract contains a limited negative covenant and where to
grant the injunction would not leave the defendant idle and so, in effect,
enforce a contractual obligation to provide personal services.25
The principal argument that Hillard relied upon in BearingPoint was that to
enforce his contractual obligations by granting injunctive relief restraining
him from taking up employment, including with Deloittes, while on garden
leave would be in effect to order specific performance of his employment
contract with BearingPoint. It was submitted that express terms in the contract
prohibiting him from engaging in ‘any other employment, business or
occupation during his employment’ was simply the ‘flip side’ of the
requirement in the contract that he ‘devote whatever hours were necessary to
discharge his obligations’ under the contract. Hillard’s counsel argued that
these terms were not limited negative covenants but that their enforcement
would amount to a complete prohibition on Hillard working elsewhere
without BearingPoint’s consent. So, it was argued, to grant an injunction
would effectively force Hillard to remain idle (although remunerated) during
the period of garden leave.
The court accepted the argument that to grant the injunction would be, in
23 There was some argument in the case as to whether TP Australia had itself repudiated the
contract in going beyond the terms of the garden leave clause by withdrawing Purcell’s
access card, which Purcell sought to rely upon as bringing the contract to an end. The court
rejected this argument: at [25]–[26].
24 (2008) 175 IR 414; [2008] NSWSC 852; BC200807684 at [28].
25 For a review of the relevant principles here see the decision of the NSW Court of Appeal in
Curro v Beyond Productions Pty Ltd (1993) 30 NSWLR 337 at 346–7. Cf Turner v The
Australasian Coal and Shale Employees’Federation (1984) 6 FCR 177 at 193; 55 ALR 635.
94 (2009) 22 Australian Journal of Labour Law
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effect, to order the employment contract to be specifically performed. Hillard
would have had no option but to sit out his enforced garden leave, as he would
not be able to earn an income from elsewhere during the period. The court
went on to hold that it followed, as a matter of logic, that Hillard should also
not be restrained from contacting clients or prospective clients of
BearingPoint or employees of BearingPoint during the remaining period of the
notice. It is not clear why that follows. An injunction in those terms would not
have had the effect of enforcing the provision of personal services or
otherwise have left Hillard idle. The point was not explained.
So BearingPoint was left with pursuing a claim for damages for breach of
contract if Hillard breached the terms of his employment contract during the
remaining period of garden leave.26 The contract contained a clause setting out
a formula for estimating the damages BearingPoint would suffer if Hillard left
early. BearingPoint did not plead this clause and argued its loss would be
‘difficult to identify and quantify’.27
Unfortunately for BearingPoint, the court also found that the
‘extraordinarily’ broad post employment restraints (even in an amended
limited form) were unreasonable restraints of trade.28
The Application of the Doctrine of Restraint of Trade
In considering injunctive relief in the context of garden leave the court in
William Hill Organisation Ltd v Tucker, held that relief had to be justified on
similar grounds to those necessary to uphold a post-employment restraint.29 In
an earlier case, reference was made for the potential for ‘abuse’ of garden
leave clauses.30 This approach has been followed in subsequent cases in the
United Kingdom31 and in Australia.32
Although the judgments in these cases were based on whether the court
should exercise its discretion to grant injunctive relief, the language is
familiar. It is similar to that used in determining the reasonableness and
legitimacy of restraint of trade clauses.
In BearingPoint, the court heard argument that the implied term permitting
garden leave was an unreasonable restraint of trade because it sterilised
Hillard absolutely. The court did not deal with the restraint of trade argument
directly. Rather, it approached the argument by considering the discretionary
nature of injunctive relief. It held that an injunction requiring Hillard to go on
garden leave for the remainder of his lengthy period of notice of 180 days was
principally directed towards preventing him, for as long as possible, from
competing with BearingPoint. The court held that this was not a legitimate
purpose and on that ground also refused to grant the injunction.33
26 [2008] VSC 115; BC200802664 at [151].
27 Ibid, at [151].
28 Ibid, at [156].
29 [1999] ICR 291; [1998] IRLR 313; [1998] EWCA Civ 615 at [25].
30 Provident Financial Group PLC & Whitegates Estate Agency v Hayward [1989] ICR 160
at 168; [1989] 3 All ER 298; [1989] IRLR 84.
31 In the Matter of Symbian Ltd v Christensen [2000] EWHC 458 and on appeal: [2000]
EWCA Civ 517.
32 Wesoky v Village Cinemas International Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 32; BC200100100 at [86].
33 [2008] VSC 115; BC200802664 at [150].
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In TP Australia, the court expressly dealt with the argument that the
restraint of trade doctrine applies during the term of the employment. It
recognised the overlap between the equitable discretion to grant injunctive
relief and the common law doctrine of restraint of trade but expressly held that
the doctrine of restraint also applies to restraints during the term of
employment including any period of notice or garden leave.34
The contract between TPAustralia and Purcell contained an express garden
leave clause which itself contained negative covenants. There were also a
number of restraint clauses in the contract that were expressed to apply during
the two year term and for three months after termination of the employment.
These restraints covered solicitation of clients, poaching existing employees
and working in competition. The restraint against post employment
competition would operate at TP Australia’s option to be exercised by it on
giving Purcell notice and paying him a month’s remuneration. This restraint
also interacted with the right to direct Purcell to take garden leave so that if
he were sent on a period of garden leave that period would be set off against
the three month post employment restraint on competition.
The question then was whether these restraints were void as unreasonable.
With respect to the garden leave clause itself, the court found that there was
no restraint involved in Purcell not being provided with work; the restraint
was in him being precluded by the clause from seeking work elsewhere during
the period of garden leave.35
The court started by noting that the ‘pendency’ of a contract of employment
will usually be sufficient justification to support the reasonableness of a
restraint during the term of employment.36 It is important here to remember
that the court found that the contract between TP Australia and Purcell
remained on foot. In resigning more than three months before the expiry of the
term Purcell had repudiated the contract. But TP Australia had elected to
affirm it. As a general proposition it should follow that the restraints in the
garden leave clause that TPAustralia was seeking to enforce (and the express
restraints) were to be considered as restraints operating during the
employment. However, the court went on to hold that although the contract
remained on foot this was not ‘a complete description of the situation’.37 It
drew a distinction between the contract of employment, on the one hand, and
the relationship of employer and employee, on the other. The contract had
survived Purcell’s repudiatory resignation but the relationship of employer
and employee had not survived because the ‘substratum of trust and
confidence’ no longer existed.38 The court referred to this relationship as the
34 (2008) 175 IR 414; [2008] NSWSC 852; BC200807684 at [37]–[46] and [55]. In making
this finding the court relied upon the decision in Peters (WA) Ltd v Petersville Ltd (2001)
205 CLR 126; 181 ALR 337; [2001] HCA 45; BC200104556 in which the High Court held
that the doctrine of restraint of trade may apply to a commercial contract for the regulation
and promotion of trading during the existence of the contract and that any such restraint
must be justified by reasonableness.
35 (2008) 175 IR 414; [2008] NSWSC 852; BC200807684 at [55].
36 Ibid, at [40].
37 Ibid, at [29].
38 Ibid, at [30].
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‘actual employment’.39 The actual employment had come to an end when
Purcell resigned. TP Australia could not unilaterally reinstate the ‘actual
employment’ by sending Purcell on garden leave and continuing to
remunerate him.40 The court reached this result even though the parties had
expressly agreed in the garden leave clause that Purcell during a period of
garden leave would ‘remain employed’ by TP Australia.
The question of whether there is a distinction between the contract of
employment and the relationship of employment has been the subject of
debate in Australian cases.41 In TP Australia the court did not explore what
impact the termination of the employment relationship might have on the
survival of other mutual obligations such as good faith and fidelity although,
as noted above, the court said that ‘trust and confidence no longer existed’. It
was not necessary for the court to explore this given that TP Australia was
relying for relief upon express terms of the contract. However, the full
consequences of this distinction on the parties continuing contractual
obligations in the context of garden leave clauses might need to be considered
in subsequent cases.42
The distinction drawn meant that the starting point for commencement of
the post employment restraints was the date upon which Purcell resigned. It
was then that the ‘actual employment’ had come to an end. The court held that
up to the time of Purcell’s resignation, and during the contractual three month
notice period — particularly given that any part of that taken as garden leave
was to be offset against the post employment restraint against competition —
restraining him from competition and solicitation would be reasonable.
Restraining him during the remainder of the contractual fixed term would be
an unreasonable restraint of trade. In that regard the court very clearly rejected
the argument that in considering the reasonableness of the restraint it should
take into account the fact that Purcell would continue to be remunerated for
the remainder of the contractual term.43 As to the operation of the express
restraint clauses after the actual employment had come to an end, the court
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid, at [32].
41 The distinction was accepted by Brennan CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ in the High Court in
Byrne & Frew v Australian Airlines (1995) 185 CLR 410 at 427–8; 131 ALR 422 at 432;
[1995] HCA 24; BC9506439. It is a distinction that is not without its detractors: see, eg, the
judgments of Gray J in Gregory v Philip Morris (1987) 77 ALR 79; 19 IR 258 and APESMA
v Skilled Engineering Pty Ltd (1994) 122 ALR 471; 54 IR 236; (1994) 1 IRCR 106. For
comment, see A Forsyth, ‘Automatic v Elective Theory Revisited’ (1994) 7 AJLL 246.
42 In a recent English case, VC Scott in the England and Wales High Court of Justice held that
while the contract remained on foot after the employer had elected to affirm the contract in
response to the employee’s repudiatory resignation, it was the conduct of the employer in
sending an employee on garden leave (pursuant to an express garden leave clause) that put
an end to the employment relationship because doing so ‘fundamentally and irretrievably
undermines the employment relationship between the parties’. The express garden leave
clause not only absolved the employee from doing any work but forbade him from taking
any part in the work of his employer, entering upon his employer’s premises or approaching
any of his co-employees: In the Matter of Symbian Ltd v Christensen [2000] EWHC 458
(Ch) at [41]–[42]. The decision was upheld on appeal but the Court of Appeal declined to
comment on the question of whether the implied duty of good faith continued during a
period of garden leave: [2000] EWCA Civ 517.
43 (2008) 175 IR 414; [2008] NSWSC 852; BC200807684 at [85]–[86].
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held that the restraint period of three months was also reasonable. In coming
to that conclusion the court had regard to the nature of TPAustralia’s business,
the legitimate interest that it had in its customer connections and in
maintaining a stable workforce. A period of three months was no more than
was reasonable for the legitimate protection of those interests.44
The court then went on to hold that Purcell should be restrained for a period
of six months from the end of his actual employment. It reasoned that
TP Australia had been under no obligation to invoke the gardening leave
clause. It could have required Purcell to work out the three month notice
period, still be bound by his contractual obligations of fidelity, and thereafter
relied upon the express post employment restraints of three months.45 So the
court arrived at a total restraint period of six months. This is an unusual
approach. What the court has done here is, in effect, enlarge the terms of the
post employment restraint to arrive at what it considered to be a reasonable
result.
Having reached a conclusion as to what period of restraint post ‘actual
employment’ was reasonable, the court went on to consider whether it should
exercise its discretion to grant an injunction preventing Purcell from acting in
breach of the restraints. It is here that the approaches taken in earlier cases to
the specific enforcement of an employment contract converge. Given that the
restraint was limited to the market in which TP Australia operated, an
injunction enforcing it would not prohibit Purcell from pursuing other fields
of employment. In other words, it would not have the effect of indirectly
requiring him to provide his services with TP Australia or otherwise remain
idle.46 There then remained the question of whether the court should exercise
its discretion to grant an injunction. Consistent with the usual approach to the
exercise of such discretion, the court considered whether an injunction would
continue to serve any legitimate interest, whether it was just in all the
circumstances that TP Australia be left to a remedy in damages and whether
the hardship to Purcell would be disproportionate. The court concluded that it
would not decline the injunction on discretionary grounds.
Conclusion
Employers considering sending an employee on garden leave, even pursuant
to an express clause, must now re-consider the effectiveness of the practice.
That a court might exercise its discretion not to grant an injunction restraining
an employee from conduct in breach of his or her contractual obligations
during a period of garden leave is not new ground. However, there seemed to
be some flexibility in the discretionary approach. The courts may have drawn
into consideration the language of restraint of trade but were also able to
consider the wider context beyond a strict application of those principles.
TP Australiamakes it clear that the doctrine of restraint of trade applies during
a period of garden leave. It follows that in drafting garden leave clauses
employers will need to bring the same considerations to bear as those involved
when drafting post employment restraints. Additionally, it seems from
44 Ibid, at [53].
45 Ibid, at [68].
46 Ibid, at [84].
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TP Australia that the reasonableness of any restraints during a period of
garden leave will have an impact on the court’s consideration of the
reasonableness of any post employment restraints. But, TP Australia went
further than that. In holding that a repudiatory breach brings the employment
relationship to an end the application of the restraint doctrine applied with full
force because the court was no longer considering the application of the
doctrine to a restraint during employment. This narrows even further the
potential for an effective garden leave clause.
It is interesting to note that the contract between Purcell and his new
employer (TP Australia’s competitor) provided for a ‘loan’ to Purcell of
$200,000 repayable only if he ceased employment or resigned without
complying with the contract’s notice provisions. Perhaps we will see an
increase in this practice and consequent litigation on whether such a clause is
in effect a penalty.
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